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Mediation has gained a strong foothold in the courts, 1 administrative
agencies2 and private disputing processes, 3 and those who participate in
mediation have received it warmly. 4 This level of acceptance has been
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1 See DONNA STIENSTRA & THOMAS E. WILLGING, ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION:
Do THEY HAVE A PLACE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS? 3-7 (Federal Judicial Center 1995),
2 See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-593 (Supp. HI
1996) (encouraging use of dispute resolution in federal agencies); CPR INSTITUTE FOR
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, STREAMLINING REGULATORY LITIGATION 1-2 (1994); CRAIG A.
McEwEN, AN EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION'S PILOT
MEDIATION PROGRAM iii-iv (1994); DAVID M. PRrIKER & DEBORAH S. DALTON,
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 9-10 (Administrative Conference of the
United States 1995).
3 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, NATIONAL SURVEY
FINDINGS ON: PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4-5 (1992); Catherine
Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming: Systematizing Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALB. L. REV.
847, 857-858 (1996); Catherine Cronin-Harris & Peter H. Kaskell, How ADR Finds a
Home in Corporate Law Departments, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LIG. 157,
158, 169 (1997).
4 See STEPHENS CLARK ET AL., COURT-ORDERED CIVIL CASE MEDIATION IN
NORTH CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS EFFECTS 41-46 (1995); JAMES S. KAKLK ET
AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 49-51 (Rand 1996); ROBERT A. LOWE ET AL., MIDDLESEX
COUNTY MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE EVALUATION PROJECT xxvii-xxviii, XXX-XXXi
(1992); NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION
RESEARCH: A REPORT ON RECENT RESEARCH FINDINGS-IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS
AND FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS 9, 25, 55, 63-66, 98 (Susan Keilitz ed., 1993)
[hereinafter NATIONAL SYMPOSiuM]; Joan B. Kelly, A Decade of Divorce Mediation
Research: Some Answers and Questions, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 373, 376
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achieved quickly; only twenty years ago, mediation was rarely employed in
this country outside the collective bargaining context. 5 At the same time,
(1996); David Seibel, To Enhance the Operation of Government: Reauthorizing the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 1 HARv. NEG. L. REv. 239, 242-243 (1996);
Kent Snapp, Five Years of Random Testing Shows Early ADR Successful, DisP. RESOL.
MAG., Summer 1997, at 16, 16-17. See generally Jeanne M. Brett et al., The
Effectiveness of Mediation: An Independent Analysis of Cases Handled by Four Major
Service Providers, 12 NEGOTIATION J. 259 (1996).
5 See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEwEN, MEDIATION: LAW, PoLICY &
PRACTICE §§ 5:02-5:03 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997). See generally LINDA SINGER,
SETrLiNG DISPUTES (1994). In the 1970s, the National Institute of Justice gave four
seed grants for community mediation programs. See COOK Er AL., NEIGHBORHOOD
JUSTICE CENTERS FIELD TEST 20-23 (1980). See generally LINDA SINGER, SETTLING
DISPUTES (1994). Over 500 programs in New York and other states now mediate tens
of thousands of disputes. See Telephone Interview with Larry Ray, Executive Director,
National Association of Family and Community Mediators (Jan. 26, 1998) (estimating,
based on sampling, that 19,500 mediators in 550 community mediation programs
mediate 45,500 cases per year). Their exit surveys indicate appreciative disputants. See
DANIEL MCGILLIS, COMMUNITY MEDIATION PROGRAMS: DEVELOPMENTS AND
CHALLENGES 53-61 (1997). Domestic relations courts in California and Maine began
requiring participation in mediation in contested cases involving children in the 1980s.
See CAL. CIr. CODE § 4607 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985) (effective 1981); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 752 (West Supp. 1994); Michelle Deis, California's Answer:
Mandatory Mediation of Child Custody and Visitation Disputes, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 149, 152 (1985); Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging
the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L.
REv. 1317, 1357 (1995). Now a tenth of the nation's domestic relations courts make
mediation a part of their procedures. See Jessica Pearson, Family Mediation, in
NATIONAL SYMpOSiuM ON COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH, supra
note 4, at 55. Divorcing parents attending the sessions would usually recommend
mediation to their friends. See generally DESMOND ELLIS & NOREEN STUCKLESS,
MEDIATING AND NEGOTIATING MARITAL CONFLICTS 96 (1996); Kelly, supra note 4. All
federal appellate courts, except the Federal Circuit, and a sprinkling of state appellate
courts mediate a portion of their cases, with positive reactions to mediation even at that
rarefied level. See ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 2-3 (Federal Judicial Center 1997); Susan FitzGibbon,
Appellate Settlement Conference Programs: A Case Study, 1993 J. DIsp. RESOL. 57,
59-61. This is merely the beginning of a long list. In many other settings, mediation
use has emerged and grown over two decades. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra,
§§ 5:02-5:03, 12:01-12:14. Positive reactions by mediation users can be found across
the landscape of disputes and institutions. See MEDIATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
VICTIMS, OFFENDERS AND COMMUNITY 1, 1-3 (Martin Wright & Burt Galloway eds.,
1989); JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS 293-435 (2d ed. 1996); LEONARD RISKIN, THE FARMER-LENDER MEDIATION
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however, disputing has not changed for most Americans; they litigate in
courts that do not encourage mediation, do not hear about mediation from
their lawyers and have no community mediation program nearby. 6
In this Article, we examine what effects a change in law could have on
expanding or eroding the mediation foothold attained over the last two
decades. The issue is timely. The decision of the National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association
Section on Dispute Resolution to draft a model or uniform law regarding
mediation, which is the impetus for this symposium issue, offers an
opportunity to propose changes in the law that will result in expanded and
more effective use of mediation. Based on results of two new studies, we
argue that provisions authorizing courts and agencies to require mediation
represent a promising means to encourage two results: (1) lawyers will
more often refer clients to mediation, even when not required to do so; and
(2) lawyers more frequently will promote early settlement with the clients
participating in settlement discussions, even when negotiations are
conducted without a mediator. These results accord with prevailing legal
policy, which favors expedited settlement and increasingly endorses party
participation in the processes of disputing.7 The prospect that increasing
mediation use also may have significant ramifications for prevailing legal
policy underscores the importance of considering mediation use in the
drafting of the uniform or model statute.
PROGRAM: IMPLEMENTATION BY THE FARMERs HOME ADMINISTRATION 22
(Administrative Conference of the United States 1991); MARK UMBREIT, MEDIATING
INT.ERPERSONAL CoNFLcTs 135-162 (1995); Glenda L. Cottam, Mediation and Young
People: A Look at How Far We've Come, 29 CREGHToN L. REv. 1517, 1535-1536
(1996); Thomas Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in the
United States Construction Industry, 31 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 65, 75-78 (1996).
6 Most divorcing parents file in a domestic relations court that does not encourage
mediation. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 55 (indicating that only a tenth of domestic
relations disputes are mediated). Most clients do not hear about mediation from their
lawyers. See Roselle Wissler, Ohio Attorneys' Experience with and Views of
Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures 1 (Mar. 1996) (on file with authors)
[hereinafter Ohio Attorney Survey]. Most neighbors in a spat have no community
mediation program nearby. See Telephone Interview with Larry Ray, supra note 5
(indicating only 550 community mediation programs nationwide). Most civil cases are
litigated and settled in traditional ways. See Deborah R. Hensler, Puzzling Over ADR:
Drawing Meaning from the Rand Report, Disp. REsoL. MAG., Summer 1997, at 8, 8-
9. In other words, mediation use remains low-despite its impressive growth-when
considered in relation to the total number of cases in our courts.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 8-21.
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This Article begins with a discussion about legal policy regarding
expanded use of mediation. Part I traces public support for settlement itself,
for expediting settlement so that it occurs earlier in the dispute and for
involvement of the parties themselves in the resolution of their disputes.
Part II examines findings from a new study of corporate disputing and from
research among Ohio lawyers in an effort to explore what factors influence
disputing attorneys to recommend mediation, to expedite settlement
discussions and to involve their clients directly in the negotiations. Part II
discusses the direct and indirect effects of laws on mediation use and the
conduct of negotiations. The discussion addresses laws that compel or
excuse participation in mediation, set qualifications and standards for
mediators, enhance enforcement for mediation clauses and mediated
agreements, recognize duties for lawyers to discuss mediation with clients
and authorize use of mediation for particular types of cases. Part IV gives a
recipe for statutory provisions that promote mediation use.
This Article focuses on promoting the use of mediation and effective
negotiation. Its advice must be tempered because provisions that might
advance these purposes could at the same time undermine other important
public policy goals. These other aims, such as fairness, access to justice
and increased settlements in mediation, topics of other articles in this
symposium, sometimes should trump the goal of promoting greater use of
mediation.
I. LEGAL POLICY FAVORING EXPANSION OF MEDIATION USE
Legal provisions that promote mediation do so as a means to the larger
end of supporting particular approaches to settlement. American courts and
legislatures traditionally place legal policy on the side of settlement, despite
some criticism from scholars.8 As discussed below, recent rulings
recognize that legal policy favors expediting settlement so that it occurs
earlier in the dispute.9 There also is some recognition in statutes of a desire
8 See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073-1075 (1984);
Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification
in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 Omo ST. J. ON Disp. RE SOL. 1, 3-4
(1993); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CR!. L.
REv. 494, 553-554 (1986); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OMio ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211, 214-216
(1995).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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to increase participation by the real parties in interest in the process leading
to resolution of their disputes. 10 This desire to encourage early settlement,
and occasionally to increase party participation in the resolution of their
disputes, underlies a legal policy promoting expanded use of mediation.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, according to the United States
Supreme Court, evidence a "clear policy of favoring settlement of all
lawsuits." 11 When discussing the policy favoring settlement, the federal
courts refer particularly to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, regarding
offers of settlement, 12 and to Rule 16, which was amended in 1993 to
expand provisions regarding settlement conferences and dispute
resolution. 13 In addition, the courts cite Federal Rule of Evidence 408,
which excludes evidence of compromise discussions when offered to prove
liability or amount of the claim, as an indication of the legal policy
favorable to compromise. 14 Aside from these rules, law professors Samuel
Gross and Kent Syverud argue that the value of "preference for private
ordering" in dispute resolution is evidenced not only by court rulings or
rules of procedure but also by the structure of the litigation system,
specifically that the justice system has few judges, many lawyers, an
adversarial presentation of evidence and a jury trial.15
Some commentators contend that the courts promote settlement only to
reduce their dockets, 16 but the courts themselves justify the policy in other
ways as well. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in the dissent to a civil rights
10 See infra text accompanying notes 130-131.
11 Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985).
12 See, e.g., id.
13 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16; see, e.g., Munford, Inc. v. Munford, Inc., 97 F.3d
449, 455 (11th Cir. 1996); Newton v. Keene Corp., 918 F.2d 1121, 1126 (3d Cir.
1990); G. Heileman Brewing v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989).
14 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l. Trust and Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse
Associates, 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986); Cornell Co. v. Septa, 1996 WL 689097,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 1996); Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, 1996 WL 337277, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1996); Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 72,
76 (S.D. W.Va. 1996).
15 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a
System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 4 (1996).
16 See Owen Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1669 (1985); Lucy V. Katz,
Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or
Two Sides of a Coin?, 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 50; Glen Newman, the summary Jury
Trial as a Method of Dispute Resolution in Federal Courts, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 177,
177 (attributing this motive to the legal profession).
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case, commented eloquently that "it would defy equity to penalize those
who achieve harmony from discord, as it would defy wisdom to impose on
society the needless cost of superfluous litigation." 17 The New York Court
of Appeals gave a more detailed explanation of the rationale for favoring
settlement:
A negotiated compromise of a dispute avoids potentially costly, time-
consuming litigation and preserves scarce judicial resources; courts could
not function if every dispute devolved into a lawsuit. Moreover, there is a
societal benefit in recognizing the autonomy of parties to shape their own
solution to a controversy rather than having one judicially imposed.
Additionally, a settlement produces finality and repose upon which people
can order their affairs. 18
Also, adoption of statutes encouraging mediation use for disputes not
headed for litigation evidences a support for private ordering for reasons
other than judicial economy. Examples include statutory provisions for
mediation of collective bargaining,' 9 gang20 and public policy disputes. 21
Legal policy does not favor settlement at any cost, however. The courts
treat the policy favoring settlement as one that should yield to other
important interests. 22 For example, the courts have given priority to the
importance of public access to court proceedings and also to a party's need
for evidence, when these interests are weighed against the need to promote
settlement through protection of secrecy. 23 Similarly, the courts have
17 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 305 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
18 Denburg v. Paker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (N.Y.
1993); see also Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir.
1992) (Emondson, J., dissenting); Bank of Am. Nat'l. Trust and Sav. Ass'n., 800 F.2d
at 344.
19 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 171(a) & (b) (1994); NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, 618
F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1980).
20 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 13826.6 (West Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 985.21, 985.413 (West Supp. 1998).
21 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 186.022(5), 186.509 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27E-73, 52:27D-9 (West Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-
38-39 (Michie Supp. 1992).
22 See, e.g., McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 211-216 (1994)
(weighing policy encouraging settlement against equitable allocation of liability among
joint tortfeasors).
23 See, e.g., Brown, 960 F.2d at 1060; Hulse v. A.B. Dick Co., 606 N.Y.S.2d
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elevated the need to limit "pressure tactics to coerce settlement" 24 over
support for compromise. They have opted for the maintenance of open
channels to enforcement agencies over encouragement to settle.25 The
courts in many ways temper their support of settlement, just as the goal of
increasing use of mediation should be tempered by the need to preserve
fairness and other values.
A detailed assessment also indicates that courts and legislatures also
support particular approaches to settlement. They encourage early
settlement, for example. 26 The Supreme Court recently commented on the
"judicial economics" secured by earlier settlement.27 The Ninth Circuit has
recognized the importance of earlier settlement in the collective bargaining
context where delay contributed to economic disarray.28 Some mediation
statutes explicitly support moving up the time of settlement for cases in
litigation or agency processes. 29 Mediation often has not been shown to
increase settlement rates, but research in a number of settings indicates that
mediation can move up the average time of settlement. 30 Bryant Garth cites
this support for dispute resolution processes whose primary effect is to
expedite settlement as evidence of a legal policy "to promote relatively
quick settlements so that the costs of discovery are limited." 31 Support for
424, 427-428 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
24 Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985).
25 See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Astra USA, Inc., 94
F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996); Hamad v. Graphics Arts Ctr., Inc., 72 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 759, 759 (D. Ore. Jan. 3, 1997).
26 See, e.g., Newton v. Keene Corp., 918 F.2d 1121, 1126 (3d Cir. 1990).
27 See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 28,
(1994).
28 See N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1980).
29 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 473 (1994) (stating purpose of Dispute Resolution Act is,
to provide inexpensive and expeditious settlement); AiAsKA STAT. § 25.20.080(a)
(Michie 1996) (requiring early scheduling of child custody mediation); CAL. Civ."
PRoc. CODE § 1775(d) (West Supp. 1998) (stating that mediation has "greatest
benefit... when used early, before substantial discovery and other litigation costs have
been incurred."); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3341(1) (West Supp. 1997)
(indicating use of mediation as method of promptly settling disputes between private
landowners).
30 See NATIONAL SYMPOSUM, supra note 4, at 8, 61-62; McEwen, supra note 5,
at 1373 ("Although mandated divorce mediation in Maine seems to encourage earlier
settlements, it does not typically replace trials.").
31 Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and the New Market for Disputes: A Framework
for Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12 STUD. iN L., POL. & Soc'y 367, 369
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an increase in use of mediation therefore can be tied to a legal policy of
expediting, not just encouraging, settlement.
Commentators argue that another typical aspect of mediation, direct
involvement of the parties in negotiation, also should be a component of
legal policy regarding, settlement,32 and there may be early signs of a
recognition of this. In interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
16's provisions regarding party attendance at settlement conferences, the
Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled that parties could be compelled to
attend the conference. 33 The court's rationale rested more heavily on
attendance as a means to increase settlement prospects than as a separate
value. 34 Some statutes, nonetheless, recognize the value of party
participation as an independent basis for promoting mediation. 35 These
statutes seem to follow a vision set out in a policy document issued in 1983:
"Enthusiasm for a wider range of dispute resolution is tied ... to a hope
that new methods will not only reduce the burden on the courts and the
economy, but will provide more satisfying means to justice for a larger
portion of the population." 36
Statutory encouragement of greater mediation use, particularly if
mediation is scheduled early in the disputing process and involves both
parties and lawyers, is consistent with a more general legal policy favoring
(1992).
32 See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 101-106 (1988) (arguing, generally, that the opportunity to speak
enhances one's experience of procedural fairness); STIENSTRA & WILLGING, supra note
1, at 19-22; E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'
Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & Soc'Y REv. 953,
980-983 (1990) (asserting that procedural formality enhances the parties' satisfaction
with the proceeding); see also Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or
Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in
Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REv. 253, 272 (1989) (urging a role for mediation that requires
party participation).
33 See G. Heileman Brewing Co v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 656-657 (7th
Cir. 1989).
34 See id. at 652-653.
35 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 14150 (indicating value of direct participation in
victim-offender mediation) (West Supp. 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4(4)(a) (West
Supp. 1997) (ensuring party participation); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1775(c) (West
1993) (supporting mediation as providing "greater opportunity to participate directly in
resolving these disputes.").
3 6 NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR
PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 8 (1984).
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expedited settlement and, increasingly, involvement of the parties in the
resolution of their disputes. The means through which a statute encourages
greater use of mediation of this type has not been clear, however. Before
discussing how particular provisions in a uniform or model mediation law
might affect mediation use, this Article examines more closely, through two
studies of disputing, what has worked, and not worked, to change the
timing and frequency of mediation use.
II. WHAT PRODUCES CHANGE? A STORY OF CORPORATE DISPUTING
AND LAWYER ATTITuDEs
Businesses are the classic "repeat players" in the legal system, 37 and
attorneys are key sources of guidance to those involved in many types of
disputes.38 When legal historian Jerold Auerbach disparaged the benefits of
mediation in 1983, he argued that mediation failed what he must have
assumed to be an important barometer of merit, saying, "[b]ar associations
do not recommend that corporate law firms divert their clients to
mediation." 39 Of course, fifteen years later, we know that bar associations
are recommending mediation to corporate law firms;40 that about a tenth of
lawyers regularly recommend mediation to corporate and other clients; 41
and that corporations use mediation in about eight percent of cases. 42 But
while Auerbach was wrong about what the barometer's reading would be,
he was correct about the barometer that others would trust. Corporate
37 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REv. 95, 97-104 (1975).
3 8 See John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each
Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 839, 890-894 (1997); Richard E. Miller & Austin
Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. &
Soc'y REv. 525, 543, 561 (1980-81) (noting that, while few individuals actually
consult with attorneys, those that do rely on them significantly); Leonard L. Riskin,
Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHO ST. L.J. 29, 36-41 (1982).
39 JEROLD AuERBACH, JUSTICE WITHoUT LAW? 144 (1983).
40 The American Bar Association has sponsored a number of conferences on
business use of mediation. See, e.g., DIsp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1997, at inside cover;
Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1994, at inside cover; Bruce E. Meyerson, ADR Committees
Update, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1994, at 11.
41 See Ohio Attorney Survey, supra note 6, at 1.
42 See generally Richard J. Klimoski et al., Non-Binding Dispute Resolution for
Business Disputes? Corporate Counsel Are of Two Minds (1993) (unpublished
manuscript on file with authors).
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parties have the resources, incentive and experience to decide whether
mediation is useful.43 Lawyers have the experience to decide and the
reliance of their clients to promote mediation use.44 If lawyers and
corporations make expanded use of mediation, others will pay attention. 45
We can better assess the likelihood of expanded use of mediation if we
understand what produced the change among lawyers and corporations.
Our insights about change among lawyers and corporate parties are
based on two collaborative research efforts. The first was a qualitative and
quantitative study, supported by the National Science Foundation, of the
handling of cases involving litigation or threatened litigation between
businesses by the legal departments of six large national corporations. 46 In
the business disputes that we studied, four of the corporations used
mediation in only 10% to 15% or fewer; one in 30%; and one in 40%.47
We examined about 30 business-to-business cases in each corporation and
spoke with counsel and business principals involved in the cases. The
second study, supported by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation,
involved exit surveys from mediators, parties and lawyers in 600 mediated
43 For an empirical study of private dispute resolution, see Brett et al., supra note
4, at 267.
44 See Lande, supra note 38, at 879-880, 889-892 (describing extensive influence
by lawyers on clients and the mediation process, especially as lawyers become more
experienced in the mediation process).
45 See A REPORT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETIvENEss, AGENDA
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 15 (1991) (listing lawyers and business leaders,
as well as government officials, as keys to influencing whether there will be expanded
voluntary use of dispute resolution).
46 The research [hereinafter Corporate Study] was done by Professor Craig A.
McEwen, Richard J. Klimoski, Nancy H. Rogers and Philip C. Sorensen, with research
assistance from Mary Courtney. After a national survey of corporate counsel, the
researchers selected six large national corporations, four of which had a reputation for
more extensive use of mediation than was typical. The six corporations agreed to share
case documents and information with the understanding that the researchers would not
divulge identities of the companies studied or open the files to those not involved in the
research. In 1993-1995, researchers reviewed files and interviewed lawyers and
principals in these corporations regarding about 30 business-to-business cases in each
company, interviewed general counsel and conducted paper surveys of in-house
counsel.
47 We cannot claim that the disputes we studied were a random sample of all
business-to-business disputes or that these percentages generalize to the universe of
business-to-business cases in each company. However, the percentages reflect the
mediation use of these companies.
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cases in four Ohio counties, 48 and surveys returned by 2300 Ohio attorneys
from among 5000 attorneys randomly selected from those licensed to
practice law in the state.49 The survey effort was collaborative among The
Ohio State University faculty and the Supreme Court of Ohio Committee on
Dispute Resolution; the data were analyzed by research psychologist
Roselle Wissler. 50
The Ohio lawyer survey results highlight the fact that lawyers favoring
use of mediation do not always refer even a significant portion of their
clients to mediation. 51 Most lawyers favored expanded use of mediation52
but only about a tenth of these lawyers regularly recommended it to
clients. 53
In the corporate context, we observed several corporations that failed to
increase use of mediation even though the business principals supported it,
the lawyers favored it and the general counsel had encouraged lawyers to
initiate mediation more frequently. 54 Five of the six corporations had signed
a Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution pledge to use
dispute resolution processes such as mediation, but mediation use remained
at similar levels for three of these companies as in the corporation declining
to sign the pledge. 55 The lawyers spoke well of mediation in four
companies, but only two of these utilized mediation more frequently than
the companies in which the lawyers disparaged mediation.56 A more
specific directive by general counsel to try mediation also failed in two of
48 See Roselle L. Wissler, Evaluation of Settlement Week Mediation (Oct. 1997)
(unpublished manuscript on file with authors) [hereinafter Settlement Week Survey].
49 See Ohio Attorney Survey, supra note 6, at 3.
50 See id. The Ohio Data Project was a cooperative program involving the
Supreme Court of Ohio Dispute Resolution Committee and Professors Jeanne Clement,
L. Camille H6bert, Richard J. Klimoski, Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers,
Andrew I. Schwebel and Charles E. Wilson.
51 See id. at 1-4.
52 See id. at 9.
53 See id. at 7. Twelve percent often referred clients to mediation. See id.
54 See Corporate Study, supra note 46.
55 See id. Lawyers in two of the companies that had signed the CPR pledge did not
know whether their company was a signatory to the pledge. See CPR CORPORATE
POLICY STATEMENT ON ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION REGISTRY OF SuBscRIBERs (CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution 1995) (listing corporations pledging to pursue ADR in
disputes with others that signed the pledge).
56 See Corporate Study, supra note 46.
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the four companies, 57 with the use of mediation remaining the same as in
the corporations without a general counsel directive. 58 Four of the
corporations had pursued a variety of educational programs on ADR, with
no noticeable effects on its use in two corporations. 59 The general counsel
in the company with most frequent mediation use told researchers that he
had initially issued a request to increase use of mediation and had been met
with no increase in use. Reflecting back, he commented, "I cannot think of
an initiative that was harder to sell. Lawyers generally were resistant to the
spread of ADR within the company." 60
Although our interviews indicated several sources of resistance to actual
use among those favoring mediation, we found in both the Ohio and
corporate studies that experience attending mediation sessions helped to
overcome these sources of resistance. 61 One source of hesitancy to use
mediation, even among those lawyers favorably disposed, was the
conventional wisdom that attorneys in substantial cases should delay
settlement discussions until after formal discovery had been completed. 62
Only incentives that dealt directly with that hesitancy or greater experience
with mediation sQheduled early in the dispute seemed sufficient to change
the belief of lawyers that they were acting irresponsibly in engaging in
settlement discussions early in the case. 63 One lawyer in a company that
had not increased mediation use, despite a directive from general counsel,
commented, "I have never settled a case in mediation. This is so because
these [business] cases involve a great deal of discovery and once discovery
is complete people just want to go to trial. People are unwilling to resolve
cases without all the facts and; thus extensive discovery. " 64 Another
explained, "In the U.S. the use of discovery will never diminish because
it's tradition .... We don't want to deal at a disadvantage with our
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 Strategies for change are discussed in Cronin-Harris, supra note 3, at 866-871.
See generally MAINSTREAMING: INSTITUTIONALIZING CoRPoRATE ADR (CPR Institute
for Dispute Resolution 1984) (presenting case studies on the strategies used by several
companies to institutionalize the use of mediation and other dispute resolution
processes).
60 Corporate Study, supra note 46.
61 See Ohio Attorney Survey, supra note 6, at 2, 4.
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opponent. "65
Taking the opposite view, the general counsel in the company using
mediation for forty percent of the business cases rejected the conventional
wisdom regarding discovery. He commented, "Attorneys want 100 percent
of the information before advising on settlement. CEOs make decisions
[involving as much money] based on 30 percent of the information. We
lawyers should put ourselves on a diet concerning our information
needs." 66 The general counsel explained that a major shift toward use of
mediation did not occur until he required attorneys to give their supervisors
a written explanation each time that they used formal discovery before
trying mediation. 67 In effect, the general counsel changed the conventional
wisdom about what was responsible representation by indicating that it was
irresponsible to spend the client's money on formal discovery without a
strong likelihood that the expenditure would materially improve the result.
Interviewed after the shift to mediation, lawyers in the forty percent
mediation company discounted the conventional wisdom of their
counterparts in other corporations, emphasizing in place of formal
discovery both informal investigation and the exchange of information that
can occur as a part of the mediation process. 68 These lawyers scheduled
mediation earlier and had a higher settlement rate in mediation than their
counterparts in the other companies. 69 In fact, they became so convinced of
the efficacy of this approach that they extended it to negotiations occurring
without mediator involvement, and they began scheduling negotiation
sessions earlier.70 The company using mediation most often in business-to-
business cases achieved settlement an average of ten months earlier than
achieved in the four companies using mediation least frequently. 71
A similar lesson comes from the Ohio mediation exit survey study.
That research demonstrates that cases scheduled for mediation prior to
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See id. For advice about incentives for attorneys, see CATHERINE CRONIN-
HARIs, BUILDING ADR iNTo Tm CORPORATE LAW DEPARTMENT 36-39 (CPR Institute
for Dispute Resolution 1997).
68 See Corporate Study, supra note 46.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id. The company using mediation in 30% of the business-to-business cases
achieved settlement an average of two months earlier than the four companies using
mediation in only 10-15% of their cases.
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completion of formal discovery were as likely to settle as those scheduled
after completion. 72 Lawyers responded in the exit surveys favorably to the
mediation, even when scheduled early. 73 Apparently, these lawyers felt
comfortable with the exchange of information once in the mediation.
Experience persuaded them that the conventional wisdom about completing
discovery before negotiating in earnest was not always valid.
Both the corporate and Ohio studies indicate another source of
resistance to mediation in addition to concerns about discovery-the
mediator's tendency to include clients at the session. Lawyers in
corporations with little mediation use hesitated to try mediation because
clients would participate, warning about trouble when clients were present
for negotiations. 74 In a typical reaction, one lawyer said, "The fewer
people who get involved the better. You don't want a mediation session
where superiors and subordinates have to discuss things that they would
rather not have [others hear]." 75 In the companies that used mediation only
occasionally, the business principals acknowledged their noninvolvement in
negotiations and spoke of "handing over" cases to lawyers. 76 Said one
general manager of a division, "Once lawyers get involved you lose
control. They may be right legally but it's bad for business.",77
In contrast, lawyers in the company using mediation most often spoke
favorably of client involvement in mediation. 78 They commented that they
had been so positively impressed by the importance of client involvement in
mediation that they had changed their approach in negotiations without a
mediator to include clients there as well. 79 In fact, their clients attended
negotiation sessions or mediation in 60% of their cases, whereas clients
attended only 27% of the negotiation sessions or mediation in the other
companies. 80 Once again, what appears to have changed the conventional
wisdom in part was experience in mediation.
In the company employing mediation most frequently, the business
72 See Settlement Week Survey, supra note 48, at ii, 33, 37-38.
73 See id.
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principals' comments reflected a different view of typical client-lawyer
relations. They assumed that they would not relinquish control of the cases
when they involved lawyers.81 One executive said, regarding relations with
lawyers, "I like lawyers. They're trained to be objective.... They keep
my feet on the ground .... As soon as I smell a dispute I get the lawyers
involved. I listen to their advice and their suggested strategies regarding
disputes." 82
The Ohio surveys also indicate that lawyers have become comfortable
with the client presence that occurred in nearly all mediation sessions.
8 3
The Ohio lawyers responded favorably to the mediation sessions and, in
fact, one of the reasons often given for nonsettlement was that a key party
was not present.84
The corporate and the Ohio studies thus support a view of change that
relies heavily upon getting lawyers into early mediation sessions.
85
Experience in mediation was the strongest predictor of whether Ohio
lawyers would refer clients to mediation, much stronger than their having
attended courses in dispute resolution. 86 So, too, in a survey of corporate
counsel, those who experienced court-ordered mediation or neutral
evaluation were more likely to suggest mediation to clients.
87
Not only does direct experience in mediation change views of its
appropriateness, so also does legitimizing mediation in the relevant
community. In-house lawyers' views toward mediation tended to be similar
within each company that we studied.8 8 In the same vein, Ohio lawyers
referred clients to mediation thirteen percent more often if a court within
their county had a mediation program.8 9 In another study, law professor
81 See id.
82 Id.
83 See Ohio Attorney Survey, supra note 6, at 11 (indicating that less than 13%
believed mediation "over-involves clients").
84 See id. at Appendix--Attorneys' Comments; Settlement Week Survey, supra
note 48, at7, 11-12.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 62-71.
86 See Ohio Attorney Survey, supra note 6, at 2, 3, 16, 27.
87 See Klimoski et al., supra note 42.
88 See generally Corporate Study, supra note 46. The strongest internal agreement
was among counsel in the two companies that most often used mediation and in the two
companies in which the general counsel did not favor expanded use of mediation. See
id.
89 See Ohio Attorney Survey, supra note 6, at 14.
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Thomas Stipanowich also noted a quick change in attorneys' attitudes
toward mediation in the construction sector once mediation use for those
disputes became well-known. 90 These results suggest that use of mediation
by some lawyers in a practice community influences others within that
community.
Other explanations of lawyer resistance to referring clients to mediation
deserve note. Elsewhere, commentators attribute this reluctance to the
lawyers' desire to maximize fees or their ingrained adversarial
personalities. 91 We do not completely discount these explanations, but
argue that they are incomplete. Salaried in-house counsel in our study were
reluctant to refer to mediation, but they had no economic interest in
resisting. 92 Counsel for insurance defense and professional negligence
parties in Ohio referred clients to mediation at about the same rates, despite
probable differences in fee structures and therefore financial incentives. 93
Further, as discussed above, once experienced in mediation, lawyers in all
sectors are more likely to become mediation boosters, even though their
personalities and the economic consequences for them do not change. 94
Although we discount the adversarial explanation in particular and give
less weight to the fee-related resistance than others, we believe that
economic concerns do play a limited role. In fact, in-house lawyers
complained to us about foot-dragging regarding mediation use by outside
lawyers, convinced that economic concerns dominated their agenda.95 One
company actually took the decision about whether to employ mediation
away from outside counsel for that reason.96 Outside our study, some
corporations give a bonus to outside counsel achieving early settlement as a
means to reverse the economic incentives. 97 Also, the general counsel in
90 See Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 123-124.
91 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING
THE LANCES AND DIsMOUNTING THE STEEDS 174 (1989); Riskin, supra note 38, at 43-
49. See generally Marguerite Millhauser, The Unspoken Resistance to Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 29 (1987).
92 See Corporate Study, supra note 46.
93 See Ohio Attorney Survey, supra note 6, author's retabulation (Feb. 13, 1998)
(on file with authors).
94 See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
95 See Corporate Study, supra note 46.
96 See id.
97 See CRoNIN-HARRis, supra note 67, at 39-41; MAINSTREAMING:
INSTITUTIONALZING COPORATE ADR, supra note 59, at D44 (Catherine Cronin-Harris
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the company using mediation most often told us that he wanted to increase
economic incentives for business principals to demand mediation from
lawyers, so he convinced the company to charge legal fees to the
department making decisions about litigation.98 In sum, the picture we
present gives little credence to the view that lawyers cannot switch from
hired guns to hired problem-solvers, but suggests that economic
disincentives may be counted among many reasons for lawyer reluctance to
use mediation.
The studies suggest that expanded use of mediation by lawyers and
corporations does not typically occur merely because the lawyers are
favorably disposed toward the idea of mediation, nor because the lawyers
have been asked by one in authority to make greater use of mediation.
Rather, because mediation, especially mediation early enough in the case to
make a difference, runs head on into conventional wisdom about effective
representation, attorneys are reluctant to make use of it. In the corporate
context, general counsel can deal directly with these fears. Beyond the
corporate context, one productive strategy to change the lawyer's
conventional wisdom and promote further references to mediation by that
lawyer is to create situations in which both lawyers and clients participate
in mediation sessions held early in the dispute. Another strategy is to
support court programs that make it preferable within the culture of the
local legal community to refer clients to mediation.
Although legal policy favors changes in the disputing climate, it is
difficult to assess what kinds of provisions in statutes or rules would be
most effective in bringing about the change. In the next part, this Article
examines sets of possible strategies to do so through the law and assess how
and why some will work better than others.
ed., 1994) (describing General Mills's use of a declining bonus system whereby amount
of bonus decreases as litigation approaches, and other companies' use of fixed amount
or percentage bonus systems based on the estimated savings to the company advised in
settlement).
98 See Corporate Study, supra note 46.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
III. THE EFFECTS OF LAW ON EXPANSION OR REDUCTION IN THE USE
OF MEDIATION
A. Compulsory Participation in Mediation
1. Compulsory Participation and Greater Use
Compulsory participation increases the use of mediation. Research
indicates substantially higher participation in mandatory than in voluntary
mediation programs. 99 Also the corporate and Ohio research reported in the
last section suggests that the expanded experience which occurs because of
mandatory mediation programs indirectly increases referrals by lawyers to
mediation. 10 0 Lawyers who attend these sessions are more likely to refer
clients to mediation than those who have not attended. 10 1 Also, lawyers
practicing in the same county as the court program are less hesitant to refer
clients to mediation. 102 If scheduled early and inclusive of both lawyers and
clients, the mandatory mediation may also have spillover effects on the
timing and inclusion of clients in negotiation occurring without a mediator.
Despite substantial debate in the commentary about mandatory
mediation, 103 most jurisdictions authorize compulsory participation in
99 See Jessica Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7
JusT. Sys. J. 420, 426-429 (1982).
100 See supra text accompanying notes 61-90.
101 See supra text accompanying notes 61-90.
102 See supra text accompanying notes 61-90.
103 See generally Frank E.A. Sander et al., Judicial (Mis)use of ADR? A Debate,
27 U. TOL. L. REv. 885 (1996) (consisting of a debate among Frank E.A. Sander, H.
William Allen and Deborah Hensler). For commentary opposing or questioning
mandatory mediation, see Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation
for Battered Women, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 272, 273-274 (1992); Dwight Golann,
Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR.
L. REV. 487, 496 (1989); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1600-1607 (1991); Richard Ingleby, Court Sponsored
Mediation: The Case Against Mandatory Participation, 56 MOD. L. REV. 441, 443
(1993); Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism:
Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin, 1993 J. DIsp. RESOL. 1, 3; Note,
Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and
Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1086 (1990). For neutral or favorable
commentary, see ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, §§ 7:01-7:04; Christy L.
Hendricks, The Trend Toward Mandatory Mediation in Custody and Visitation Disputes
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mediation for some types of cases, 104 and organizations in the field endorse
mandatory mediation if appropriate safeguards are in place. 105 Statutes and
rules implementing mandatory mediation employ a variety of formats. 10 6
These laws sometimes authorize the courts or agencies to require
participation in particular types of cases107 or to require the participation of
all parties if requested by one party.108 Other statutes mandate participation
in mediation for all cases of a particular type, such as contested domestic
cases involving minor children, 09 or make participation in mediation a
prerequisite to filing an action, such as all farm mortgage cases in which
mediation is not waived by the farmer"10 or voter registration litigation.' 1 '
of Minor Children: An Overview, 32 J. FAM. L. 491, 493-496 (1993-94); Daniel A.
Noonan & Judith M. Bostetter, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Wisconsin: A Court
Referral System, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 609, 609-611 (1995); Michael E. Weinzierl,
Wisconsin's New Court-Ordered ADR Law: Why it is Needed and its Potential for
Success, 78 MARQ. L. Rlv. 583, 583-584 (1995).
104 See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, at Appendix B.
105 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION RESOLUTION 112 (1997) (demonstrating that
the ABA supports court mediation and apparently does not oppose mandatory mediation
because the resolution specifically excludes mandatory non-binding arbitration but does
not exclude mandatory mediation); MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT
COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS 1 (Society for
Professionals in Dispute Resolution 1991); NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-
CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS 5-1 to 5-5 (1990).
106 See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 7:02.
107 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 173 (1994) (providing that all parties must participate
when Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services decides to hold mediation of
collective bargaining disputes); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060 (1996); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3170 (West 1996); IOWA CODE § 598.41 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.755 (1995);
DEL. FAM. CT. R. 201 (1996).
108 See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 205-5.1 (1985) (providing that, if one party
requests mediation, all other parties to the geothermal activities dispute may be required
to participate); MINN. STAT. § 120.1701 (1993 & Supp. 1998) (requiring all parties to a
special education dispute to participate in mediation if requested by one of the parents);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.403 (1996) (stating that the court may require participation by
parents in child custody and visitation disputes if grandparent requests mediation).
109 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 251 (West 1998).
110 See, e.g., IowA CODE § 654A.6 (1996); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
38.3(c) (1997) (mandating mediation for farm-nuisance litigation).
Ill See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.023(3) (West 1990); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 5080-18 (1985) (mandating mediation for certain real estate actions); WASH. REv.
CODE § 59.20.080(2) (1990 & Supp. 1998) (mandating mediation for mobile home
evictions).
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In other instances, the parties are not compelled to participate in mediation,
but suffer negative consequences if they do not, such as loss of the right to
recover attorney's fees, 112 professional sanctions113 and decertification for a
business. 114 Yet another approach is to require the parties to agree to a
dispute resolution process that they must use during the court process115 or
prior to returning to the court or agency. 116 Some statutes and rules stop
short of requiring participation and instead require attendance at a
conference to discuss the possibility of using mediation or another dispute
resolution process. 117
It is too early to assess whether any particular approach to compulsory
participation is superior to others from the standpoint of enhancing
participation in mediation and having a positive spillover effect on referrals
to mediation or effective negotiation. Regardless of the mandatory
participation mechanism, the participants seem as satisfied and settle about
the same proportion of cases. In fact, settlement rates seem to resemble
those of voluntary programs. "18
2. Exemptions from Compulsory Participation
In order to preserve fairness and access to adjudication, laws
authorizing compulsory participation in mediation exempt a number of
112 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 723.037-723.038 (West 1988).
113 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.14 (West Supp. 1998).
114 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 559.927 (West 1997).
115 See, e.g., N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 170 (Michie 1997).
116 See, e.g., CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 44204(d) (West 1996) (requiring dispute
resolution clause in agreements between Native American tribes and agencies on
environmental disputes); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 287.073(5)(b) (West 1990) (requiring
dispute resolution clause in information technology resources contracts); IND. CODE
§ 13-25-5-8 (Supp. 1997) (requiring dispute resolution clause in environmental work
plans); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1806 (1995) (requiring mediation clause in disability
provider contracts); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44A-21(b)(3) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring
mediation clause for housing liens); OR. REv. STAT. § 90.610 (1995) (requiring dispute
resolution clause in specified rental agreements); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.184(3)
(1997) (requiring dispute resolution clause in custody/visitation agreement between
divorcing parents).
117 See, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. OF PRAC. § 114.07 (West 1998).
118 See NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 4, at 74-75. One exception may
warrant further inquiry-the Ohio surveys indicate higher settlement rates when at least
one party requested the mediation. See Settlement Week Survey, supra note 48, at 17.
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cases.119 Mandatory domestic mediation statutes often exempt cases
involving domestic violence, and cases involving a parent who suffers from
substance abuse or mental illness, a severe bargaining disadvantage, or
undue hardship in attending the session. 120 Outside the domestic context,
parties are exempted when attendance would unduly burden one party.' 21
Occasionally, parties can simply opt out of mandatory mediation without
reason.122
The relative success of various approaches to exempting parties from
mandatory participation, in terms of the effects on enhancing participation,
is difficult to assess. There are few studies and little reported case law on
these exemptions. 123 Their effects on the fairness of the process or access to
further litigation are subjects of other articles in this symposium.
119 See generally ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 5, § 7:02 (listing exceptions).
120 See AiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-381.23 (West 1991) (excluding cases where
there is undue hardship); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-311(1) (1997) (excluding cases
with domestic abuse); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(2)(b) (West Supp. 1998) (excluding
case if significant history of violence would compromise mediation); LA. Rv. STAT.
ANN. § 363 (West Supp. 1998) (excluding case if court finds that family violence
exists); MINN. STAT. § 518.619(2) (1990) (excluding cases with probable cause of
domestic abuse); NEv. R~v. STAT. ANN. § 3.500(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 1993) (allowing
exclusion of case with a showing of child abuse or domestic violence); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-13.1(c) (Supp. 1995) (excluding cases with allegations of party or child
abuse, substance abuse, mental health and undue hardship); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
09.1-02 (1997) (excluding case if there is an issue of abuse); OHio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.052(A) (Anderson 1996) (providing that conviction or determination that parent
perpetrated abusive act is a factor in deciding whether mediation is appropriate); OR.
REv. STAT. § 107.179(3) (1995) (excluding cases where there is emotional distress);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-22 (1995) (excluding case if mediation participation would
cause undue hardship, substance abuse, mental illness or threaten health or safety);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(8)(b) (West 1993) (excluding cases where there is undue
hardship); MD. R. SPEC. PROC. S73A(b)(2) (1990) (excluding case if there is genuine
issue of physical or sexual abuse of party or child); N.J. R. GEN. APPL. 1.40-5
(excluding cases if there is in effect a preliminary or final order regarding domestic
violence pursuant to state statute).
121 See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-22-311(1) (1997).
122 See OR. REV. STAT. § 36.185 (Supp. 1996).
123 See Bauer v. Hardy, 651 So. 2d 748, 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
party who had petitioned for bankruptcy and was not able to pay mediator's fee should
be exempted from payment); McEwen et al., supra note 5, at 1335-1340 (regarding
exclusions for domestic cases).
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3. Compulsory Attendance by Parties
Another subject of varying approaches has been whether both the
parties and attorneys are required to, encouraged to or allowed to attend
mediation sessions. 124 When a statute does not authorize a court to require
attendance of parties, the courts have struggled with whether Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 16 allows the court to compel attendance by represented
parties. The language of Rule 16 is unclear on this point, and the courts
weigh competing policy considerations. 125 On the one hand, the courts note
that party attendance seems to improve the chances of settlement. 126 On the
other hand, courts express concern that trial judges require attendance when
it would be so burdensome for a party as to force settlement.1 27 In a
Seventh Circuit case, for example, dissenters note that one court had
required a cabinet member-designee to attend a settlement conference on
the day of his Senate confirmation hearings.' 28 In another example of
burdensome attendance requirements, a court required attendance by the
board of trustees of an insurance company in an insurance case. 129
There seems to be strong support for including provisions that require
attendance at mediation sessions by parties while exempting those cases
when attendance would be unduly burdensome. Absent statutory
authorization, some courts will not include the parties.
Setting aside these broader policy reasons for client inclusion, the
corporate and Ohio studies, discussed above, suggest that mediation with
party attendance helps to change the lawyers' conventional wisdom that
clients should be excluded from the give and take of negotiations and serves
the public policy of encouraging more direct involvement of parties in the
124 See ROGERS & McEwN, supra note 5, § 6:07 (listing approaches).
125 Rule 16(a) authorizes courts to require appearances at conferences by "the
attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
Numerous courts have weighed these competing policy considerations. See G.
Heileman Brewing v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 1989); Dvorak v.
Shibata, 123 F.R.D. 608, 609-610 (D. Neb. 1988); In re Air Crash at Stapleton Int'l
Airport, Denver, 720 F. Supp. 1433, 1438-1439 (D. Colo. 1988).
126 See, e.g., G. Heileman Brewing Co., 871 F.2d at 652-653; Dvorak, 123
F.R.D at 609-610; In reAir Crash, 720 F. Supp. at 1438-1439.
127 See, e.g., In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 905 (5th Cir. 1993).
128 See G. Heileman Brewing Co., 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
129 See Physicians Protective Trust Fund v. Overman, 636 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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resolution of their conflicts. 130 Thus, requiring participation by parties
when their attendance would not be unduly burdensome has been deemed
better for settlement reasons, but it is also better as a way to create the
spillover effect of encouraging lawyers to refer clients to mediation and to
include clients in negotiations without a mediator. 131
4. Compulsory Participation by Lawyers
Legislators have been ambivalent about inclusion of lawyers in
mediation, especially for family and interpersonal disputes. A Missouri
statute prohibits attorney participation at special education mediation
sessions.132 Other statutes permit the mediator to exclude or limit
participation of lawyers. 133 In some jurisdictions, the programs limit
mediation to issues that normally would not be handled by lawyers so that
lawyer attendance at domestic mediation sessions is the exception rather
than the rule. 134
The Ohio and corporate research supports encouragement of lawyer
participation in mediation as a means to influence lawyers to recommend
mediation to their clients and to change their approach to negotiations at
130 See supra Part II.
131 Party participation is desirable for a variety of reasons beyond the scope of this
article. For a discussion of party participation in mediation, see generally Leonard L.
Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference: The Lessons of G.
Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059 (1991).
Professor Riskin argues that, although there are competing policy concerns regarding
party participation, the weight is on the side of including parties. See id. at 1114-1116.
The National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs took this view as
well. See NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS,
supra note 105, at 2-5 (Center for Dispute Settlement 1992).
132 See Mo. REv. STAT. § 162.959.9 (Supp. 1998).
133 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3182 (West 1994) (permitting exclusion of
lawyers); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(a)(6) (1995) (permitting exclusion of lawyers);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.1011(d) (West Supp. 1998) (permitting lawyers to speak only to
clients during session); Wis. STAT. ANN § 767.11(a) (1993) (permitting exclusion of
lawyers); ARiz. SUPER. CT. R. LOCAL PRAC. (Maricopa County) (West 1996)
(permitting exclusion of lawyers after beginning of session).
13 4 See McEwen et al., supra note 5, at 1331 n.72 (reporting that only 14% of
domestic court mediation programs, most of which limit mediation to custody and
visitation rather than economic issues, report that lawyers attend most mediation
sessions).
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other points. 135 In other words, enhancement of mediation use and
encouragement of direct and early negotiation weigh in favor of
encouraging lawyer attendance at mandatory mediation sessions.
Aside from the desire to expand use of mediation and improve
negotiations, lawyer participation should be encouraged to improve the
fairness of the mediation. Research on the balance between the need to
preserve fairness and the fear that lawyers will disrupt the effectiveness of
mediation sessions indicates that the balance weighs in favor of lawyer
inclusion. 136 Both the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution and
the Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs weighed these
considerations and endorsed encouragement of lawyer attendance for
fairness reasons. They noted: "Lawyers may act as a crucial check against
uninformed and pressured settlement, particularly when they are
knowledgeable about the dispute resolution process. It is the parties in
consultation with their lawyers- not public authorities- who are in the best
position to decide when the lawyers' presence is indicated." 137
In other words, if lawyers attend mediation, they protect against
unfairness and, at the same time, the process makes them more effective at
recommending mediation and in their negotiations.
In sum, the effort to increase use of mediation and encourage direct and
early negotiation is aided by authorization to compel participation in
mediation. A model statute should permit mandatory mediation as long as
safeguards are in place to meet goals discussed in other articles in this
symposium. The statute's purpose clause should also encourage early
scheduling of mediation in an effort to change lawyers' conventional
wisdom to postpone earnest negotiations until later in the case as well as to
save parties' costs. To increase direct negotiation outside of mediation,
explicit authorization for party attendance when not unduly burdensome or
unfair should be a part of the mandatory mediation provisions. In addition,
the statute should make clear that the parties may bring their lawyers to
participate at the mediation session, as this provision serves to promote its
educational function for attorneys as well as fairness of the process.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
136 See McEwen et al., supra note 5, at 1394 (summarizing effects of lawyer
attendance on fairness and party's participation and results).
137 MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION, supra note 105, at
18; National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs 10-3 (Center for
Dispute Settlement) (on file with authors).
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B. Mediator Qualification/Standards and the Use of Mediation
Some commentators have contended that mediation use is tied to the
quality and cost of mediators.1 38 In other words, the more available high
quality and low cost mediators are, the more likely that they will be used.
This truism provides little guidance to drafters of a uniform or model
statute. The problem is that what might be done through law to encourage
quality, especially through mediator qualifications and standards, 39 may
well increase cost. Also, what helps quality in one way may hurt it in
another. For example, extensive mediator qualifications may improve the
mediation program's reputation but interfere with program administrators'
efforts to create a diverse pool of mediators or to provide access to
mediation in predominantly rural areas.140
138 See Bobby Marzine Harges, Mediator Qualifications: The Trend Toward
Professionalism, 1997 BYU L. REv. 687, 701.
139 For commentary on mediation qualifications and standards, see generally
ALBIE DAvis, How To ENSURE HIGH-QUALITY MEDIATION SERvICEs: THE ISSUE OF
CREDENTIALING IN COMMUNITY MEDIATION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS AND
RESEARCHERS 203 (1991); KImBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE 207-209 (1994); ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 11.02; W. Lee
Dobbins, The Debate Over Mediation Qualifications: Can They Satisfy the Growing
Need to Measure Competence Without Barring Entry into the Market?, 7 U. FLA. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 95 (1995) (addressing the debate concerning mediator qualifications,
consumer choice and the free market); Deborah B. Gentry, The Certification
Movement: Past, Present, and Future, 11 MEDIATION Q. 285 (1994); Edward
Hartfield, Qualfications and Training Standards for Mediators of Environmental and
Public Policy Disputes, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 109 (1988); Margaret Shaw,
Mediator Qualifications: Report of a Symposium on Critical Issues in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 12 SErON HALL LEGIS. J. 125 (1988) (highlighting debate
concerning need for guidelines); Carole Silver, Models of Quality for Third Parties in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 Omo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 37 (1996) (analyzing
six models of "third party" practice and suggesting regulatory action); Ann Taylor, The
Four Foundations of Family Mediation: Implications for Training and Certification, 12
MEDIATION Q. 77 (1994) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of lawyers and
mental health professionals as mediators); Symposium, Certification of Mediators in
California, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 609 (1996); Symposium, Who Really Is a Mediator?: A
Special Section on the Interim Guidelines, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 293 (1993); Nichol M.
Schoenfield, Note, Turf Battles and Professional Biases: An Analysis of Mediator
Qualifications in Child Custody Disputes, 11 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 469 (1996).
140 For a discussion of the impact of mediator qualifications of the process, see
ROBERT M. JONES ET AL., ENSURING COMPETENCE AND QUAL=TY IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PRACTICE 18 (SPIDR Commission on Qualifications 1995) [hereinafter
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The composition of the mediator pool affects mediation use in yet
another way. Lawyers who are trained as mediators or serve as mediators
are more likely to recommend mediation to their clients, according to the
Ohio attorney surveys.' 4 ' Therefore, mediator qualifications such as
continuing education and extensive training requirements may discourage
part-time lawyer-mediators, 142 and thereby also inhibit growth in the use of
mediation.
Given the possible cost of mediator qualifications, in terms of
discouraging mediation, it is important to be certain that the qualifications
are worth the price in terms of improving quality. Research casts doubt on
an approach to mediator qualifications that merely synthesizes the
approaches taken by statute and rule, usually a combination of educational
degrees and hours of mediation training. 143 The Ohio mediation exit
surveys demonstrated no dramatic differences in settlement rates, party
satisfaction, party participation or party or attorney perceptions of fairness
among mediators by hours of mediator training or expertise in the subject
matter of the dispute-two common mediator qualifications. 144 The lawyers
in our corporate survey rarely searched for mediators in terms of these
statutory qualifications. Instead, they looked for qualities of experience and
styles of mediation not regulated by most qualifications standards.145 Those
lawyers experienced in mediation spoke more often of timing and getting
the mediation going than about having mediators who met specific
qualifications. They preferred mediators who had mediated often but they
frequently let the other side select the mediator. 146 In one in-house
ENSURING COMPETENCE]; QUALIFYING NEUTRALS: THE BASIC PRINCIPLEs 9 (SPIDR
Commission on Qualifications 1989).
141 See Ohio Attorney Survey, supra note 6, at 14-15.
142 For a listing of statutes requiring educational degrees and training, see
McEwen et al., supra note 5, at 1343 nn. 149-150; Harges, supra note 138, at 695-
700. For proposals to use skills testing instead, see TEST DESIGN PROjECT, INTERIM
GuIDELINES FOR SELECTING MEDIATORS 1-2 (1993); Symposium, Who Really Is a
Mediator? A Special Section on the Interim Guidelines, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 293, 295-
353 (1993).
143 See QUALIFYING NEUTRALS, supra note 140, at 9. For charts of statutory
qualifications, see Harges, supra note 138, at 695; McEwen et al., supra note 5, at
1397.
144 See supra text accompanying note 130.
145 See Corporate Study, supra note 46.
146 See id.; see also CRONIN-HARRIS, supra note 67, at 42-43 (discussing the
willingness to "allow the opposing party to ... recommend neutrals from which the
856
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memorandum, lawyers were advised to defer to the other side's choice of
mediators, even if the person nominated lacked experience or the desired
style:
Lawyers will often want to know if the company has used the neutral
before, the person's level of experience, who his or her references are,
etc. Also, being naturally suspicious types, a lawyer will often be cool to
the idea of voluntary ADR altogether unless the neutral is someone
instantly recognizable, such as a former judge. This bias has on occasion
led us to agree to the retention of a former Judge or publicly-recognized
figure, when we felt better skilled neutrals were available
elsewhere.... Again, the first requirement is to create the environment
for the success of the mediation; if this requires selection of a publicly-
recognized neutral, such a selection is probably the right step. 47
In the Ohio mediation exit survey, lawyers were similarly uncritical of
the mediators' competence, 148 though 65% of the mediators had 6 hours of
mediation training or less, 30% had mediated 3 cases or fewer and 58%
practiced in a substantive area unrelated to the case.1 49 Similar findings
were reported in a Maine study of divorce lawyers; Maine lawyers said that
they could take over and have an effective negotiation session even with a
weak mediator. 150 This evidence does not support a view that highly trained
and experienced mediators are a major factor in increasing mediation use.
Skepticism about existing statutory qualifications seems to be a broader
conclusion of those in the field. In fact, the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution has warned legislators not to transform typical program
qualifications into licensure requirements, stating that "[t]he state of
knowledge is nascent concerning what qualifications practitioners require to
provide effective dispute resolution services." 151
Given the costs and the reason to question the benefits, drafters should
proceed cautiously in imposing mediator qualifications. The same caution
may be appropriate for mediator standards, discussed in another article in
this symposium, because they may promote defensive practices and add to
ultimate neutral will be selected").
147 Corporate Study, supra note 46.
148 See Settlement Week Survey, supra note 48, at 12.
149 See id. at 6-7.
150 See McEwen et al., supra note 5, at 1357-1358.
151 ENSURING COMPETENCE, supra note 140, at 18.
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the expense of mediation. 152 Drafters should look for strong evidence of
effectiveness of both mediator qualifications and standards because they
may inhibit the use of mediation.
C. Other Strategies for Increasing Mediation Use Through Statutory
Provisions
A number of other provisions in existing laws might appear to enhance
the use of mediation. These include provisions to enforce mediation
clauses, to provide stronger sanctions for violation of mediated agreements
than for violation of other settlement agreements, to require attorneys to
discuss mediation with clients and to authorize creation of mediation
programs for a variety of types of disputes. We remain unconvinced that
these types of provisions will substantially increase the use of mediation.
1. Enforcement of Mediation Clauses
About a tenth of attorneys who prepare contracts in their practices often
advise clients to include a mediation clause, according to the Ohio survey
research. 153 Mediation clauses may increase the chances that people will
use mediation once a dispute arises, 154 and new research supports the view
that settlement is as likely in mediation pursuant to a mediation clause as in
mediation agreed to after the dispute arises. 155 A few statutes recognize the
importance of enforcement of mediation clauses by providing for their
enforcement. 156
152See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 11:07 (warning about costs of
regulating mediators); John D. Feerick, Toward Uniform Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, 38 TEx. L. REv. 455, 455-460 (1997) (discussing the Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators, adopted by the American Bar Association Section on Dispute
Resolution, the American Arbitration Association and (in principle) the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution in 1994); Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt,
Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 2 HARv. NEGOTIATION L.
REv. 87, 87-93 (1997) (advocating more stringent standards than contained in the
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators).
153 See Ohio Attorney Survey, supra note 6, at 8.
154 See J. Michael Keating, Jr., Getting Reluctant Parties to Mediate: A Guide to
Advocates, 13 ALTERNATvES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 9, 11 (1995).
155 See generally Brett et al., supra note 4.
156 See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 508D-18 (1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
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Statutory provision for the enforcement of mediation clauses may not
enhance the use of or compliance with them, however. Even without
statutory authorization, the courts have enforced mediation clauses as a
matter of contract law157 or by analogy to the Federal Arbitration Act.
158
Although courts that refuse to apply the Federal Arbitration Act to
mediation will not give summary enforcement to the mediation clause,
those courts will dismiss litigation if a party fails to comply. 159 Given the
inexpensive character of most mediation, the parties are likely to comply if
they will be precluded from litigating until they comply. 160 If so, then
existing contract law doctrines provide sufficiently for their enforcement;
statutory provision for enforcement of mediation clauses may be
unnecessary except to codify the law, in the hope that this would encourage
more use of mediation clauses. 161
A more fruitful avenue, in terms of expanding use, may be in requiring
mediation clauses in settlement agreements. Some states require dispute
resolution clauses in domestic court custody and visitation settlements, 162
rental agreements, 163 environmental agreements, 164 disability provider
§ 342.277 (Michie 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 77-4A-2 (Michie Supp. 1997).
157 See, e.g., DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 811 F.2d 326,
335-337 (7th Cir. 1987); Haertl Wolff Parker, Inc. v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co.,
1989 WL 151765, at *4 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 1989). But see Design Benefit Plans, Inc. v.
John Enright, 940 F. Supp. 200, 204-206 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (enforcing combined
mediation and arbitration clause); Regan v. Regan, 660 So. 2d 1166, 1167-1168 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to compel father to pay attorney's fees of mother for
failure to abide by contract provision requiring mediation).
158 See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 632 F. Supp. 456, 461 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (regarding process through which the parties received a nonbinding evaluation);
Annapolis Prof 1 Firefighters Local 1926, IAFF, AFL-CIO v. City of Annapolis, 642
A.2d 889, 894 (Md. Ct. App. 1993) (appearing in dicta). But see Harrison v. Nissan
Motor Corp. in U.S.A, 111 F.3d 343, 350-352 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining to apply
Federal Arbitration Act to clause for informal dispute resolution process for automobile
purchasers).
159 See supra notes 157-158.
160 See RoGERs & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 8:01.
161 See Merton C. Bernstein, The Desirability of a Statute for the Enforcement of
Mediated Agreements, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 117, 117-118 (1986) (arguing
that lawyers will be less reluctant to use mediation if codification makes the related law
clear and gives respectability to it).
162 See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (West 1997); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 26.09.184 (1997).
163 See OR. REV. STAT. § 90.610 (1995).
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contracts, 165 information technology agreements 166 and housing liens.167
Analogizing to research on mandatory mediation, one could argue that
required mediation clauses would expand mediation use significantly.
2. Sanctions for Violation of Mediated Agreements
People may be hesitant to participate in mediation if the results are not
enforceable as a legal or practical matter. 168 Several statutes have explicitly
provided for the enforcement of mediated agreements, apparently to
overcome this hesitancy.' 69 Hesitancy grounded in fears regarding
enforcement appears to be baseless, however. Mediated settlements, in
most instances, are on the same footing for legal enforcement as other
settlements. 170 Most parties are content enough with the enforceability of
these results to settle. 171 Moreover, the practical reality is that the parties
are as likely- and sometimes more likely-to abide voluntarily by mediated
settlements as by other settlements or to comply with judgments after
164 See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 44204 (West 1997); IND. CODE §§ 13-7-8.9-13,
13-25-58 (1997).
165 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1806 (1995).
166 See FLA. STAT. § 287.073(5)(b) (1997).
167 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44A-21(b)(3) (West 1997).
168 See Fiss, supra note 8, at 1074-1075 (suggesting that settlement provides less
of a basis for court enforcement than a litigated judgment). For commentary on the
need for a statute regarding enforcement, see Bernstein, supra note 161, at 117
(arguing for a statute); Robert P. Bums, The Enforceability of Mediated Agreements:
An Essay on Legitimation and Process Integrity, 2 Omo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 93,
93-94 (1986) (arguing against a statute); Cathleen Cover Payne, Enforceability of
Mediated Agreements, 1 Oio ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 385, 404-405 (1986) (arguing
that mediated agreements should be treated no differently than other settlements).
169 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-32 (1997); HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-5(i)
(1997); IND. CODE § 22-9-1-6(p) (1997); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.610 (Michie
1997).
170 See generally ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 5, § 4:13. See also Sheng v.
Starkey Lab., 117 F.3d 1081, 1083-1084 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting validity of mediated
agreement governed by contract law); Martin v. Black, 909 S.W.2d 192, 195-196
(Tex. App. 1995 writ denied) (noting validity of mediated agreement governed by
contract law).
171 See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlement, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1340 (1994) (citing research
indicating that two-thirds of all civil cases settle prior to trial); Gross & Syverud, supra
note 15, at 1.
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trial. 172
A few problems have arisen regarding confidentiality and enforcement
of oral settlements reached during mediation. Some courts have ruled that
evidence of statements made during the mediation sessions are privileged
and cannot be used to establish an oral agreement. 173
A number of solutions to this problem are readily available, however.
Some jurisdictions already require settlement agreements to be in
writing. 174 Also, a recent California case indicates that the parties can reach
an enforceable oral agreement by dictating into a recorder after the
mediation has ended. 175 Another means to resolve the problem is to create
an exception to the mediation privilege when the validity of the agreement
is in issue. 176
It might be argued that heightened enforcement provisions for mediated
agreements would encourage greater use of mediation. Some statutes
actually provide additional sanctions or summary enforcement for
agreements reached during mediation. 177 Nonetheless, these provisions for
added sanctions might be attractive to some parties but deter other parties
from mediating. Further, the parties themselves can design stiffer penalties
for violations through contract-related approaches such as liquidated
damages, if the concern about insufficient sanctions for violations inhibits
settlement.
In short, it is difficult to see how provisions for greater enforcement of
mediated agreements would substantially increase the use of mediation or
why codification of existing contract doctrines would lead to greater use. 178
172 See NATIONAL SYMPosIUM, supra note 4, at 26, 72.
173 See, e.g., Ryan v. Garcia, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158, 159 (Cal. App. 4th 1994);
Hudson v. Hudson, 600 So. 2d 7, 8-9 (Fla. App. 1992); Cohen v. Cohen, 609 So. 2d
785, 786 (Fla. App. 1992).
174 See, e.g., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(b); TEx. R. Civ. P. 11; see also In re Allen,
1996 WL 686895, at *1 (Tex. App. Nov. 4, 1996); Burckhard v. Del Monte Corp., 56
Cal. Rptr.2d 569, 571 (Cal. App. 4th 1996); Murphy v. Padilla, 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 722,
723 (Cal. App. 4th 1996).
175 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Sumner, 50 Cal. Rptr.2d 200, 202 (Cal.
App. 1996).
176 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11 (1997); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-
103 (Michie 1997).
177 See, e.g., GA. CODE § 45-19-32 (1997); HAw. REv. STAT. § 378-5(i) (1997);
IND. CODE § 22-9-1-6(p) (1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.610 (Michie 1997).
178 But see Bernstein, supra note 161, at 117-119 (arguing for such a statute);
Bums, supra note 168, at 115 (arguing against a statute on enforcement of mediated
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3. Duties for Attorneys to Discuss Mediation with Clients
Professor Frank Sander has argued that lawyers ought to have a duty to
advise clients about the use of dispute resolution options. 179 Sander argues,
"[I]f... our mission is to help clients find the best way to handle their
disputes... why shouldn't it be part of our explicit professional obligation
to canvass those options with clients?" 180
An initial question is whether an attorney duty, if advisable, should be
in professional responsibility rules rather than in uniform or model
provisions for a statute or court rule. Colorado has imposed such a duty
through its code of ethics for attorneys,' 8 ' and Michigan and Kansas
through ethical provisions require lawyers to pass on the suggestion of use
of alternative dispute resolution if raised by opposing counsel. 182 In Texas
and Ohio, lawyers are exhorted to advise clients about dispute resolution
options in lawyer creeds. 183
Although the lawyer duties in Colorado, Texas, Michigan and Kansas
were imposed through codes of ethics or interpretations of those codes, in
two jurisdictions the provisions regarding lawyers' advice to clients were
part of a court rule or statute. New Jersey lawyers are required by Supreme
Court rule to inform clients of dispute resolution. 184 An Arkansas statute
"encourages" lawyers to advise clients about dispute resolution
processes. 185
The more important question is not the placement of such duties in
ethical provisions versus rules or statutes, but rather their advisability as a
agreements).
179 See Frank E.A. Sander & Michael Prigoff, At Issue: Professional
Responsibility: Should There Be a Duty to Advise of ADR Options?, 74 A.B.A. J. 5050,
5050 (1990); see also Forest Mosten, The Duty to Explore Settlement, FAM. L. NEwSL.
2525, 2525 (State Bar of California Family Law Section 1990) (regarding malpractice
liability for failure to encourage dispute resolution options).
180 Sander & Prigoff, supra note 179, at 50.
181 See Colorado Adopts Ethics Rule, 10 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LIG. 70,
70 (1992).
182 See Kansas Bar Association Ethics Advisory Committee, Opinion No. 94-1
(1994); State Bar of Michigan Standing Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics,
Opinion No. RI-255 (1996).
183 See Texas Supreme Court Lawyer's Creed; A Lawyer's Creed, 70 Omno ST. B.
ASS'N RPR. xli (1997).
184 See N.J. Sup. CT. R. 1:40-1 (West 1998).
185 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-101 (Michie 1997).
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means to increase use of mediation. The corporate research, discussed
above,' 8 6 tells the story of lawyers who had been directed to consider
mediation in their cases but who typically found a reason why mediation
would not be appropriate. Those who ultimately began to recommend
mediation regularly did so only after incentives regarding discovery were
changed, after experience attending mediation sessions and after change in
their office legal community. This research does not provide a strong
endorsement for lawyer duties. It seems wise to await more research
documenting changes in the bar in Colorado, Arkansas and elsewhere under
their new provisions for attorneys before concluding that duties for lawyers
to advise about mediation should be a part of the uniform or model
mediation statute.
4. Provisions Authorizing Use of Mediation
Hundreds of mediation statutes are largely limited to provisions that
authorize or encourage the use of mediation by particular agencies.187 At
best, these provisions provide a legitimacy to mediation. If lawyers tend to
resist use of mediation for the reasons discussed above, these laws resemble
the lawyer's duties to advise clients about dispute resolution processes in
terms of their likely effects. It seems best to await further evidence about
their effectiveness before considering inclusion in a uniform or model law
of a list of agencies encouraged to employ mediation. Once a uniform or
model statute is enacted, legislators can make reference to that generic law
when expressing a policy in favor of mediating particular kinds of cases if
they deem it helpful to express support for use of mediation.
In sum, legislative efforts to encourage use of mediation through
provisions for enforcement of mediation clauses and mediated agreements,
recognition of new duties for lawyers or encouragement for particular
agencies to consider reference to mediation do not seem to be especially
promising means of increasing mediation use. Requiring mediation clauses
in certain settlement agreements may be helpful, however. Overall, these
provisions, at least as an avenue for expanding use of mediation, should be
low on the list of priorities for a uniform or model mediation law drafting
committee.
186 See supra Part II.
187 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-8-7.1 (1997) (regarding the Department of
Community Affairs); see also ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 5, at App. C (listing
current statutes authorizing use of mediation).
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IV. A RECIPE FOR STATUTORY PROVISIONS TO INCREASE USE AND
ENCOURAGE MORE EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
The last two decades of growth in the use of mediation seem to yield
two observations. First, experience may be the best teacher with respect to
mediation and, to some degree, negotiation. A statute that authorizes courts
and public agencies to require both lawyers and parties to participate in
mediation seems to persuade them to increase its use and to engage jointly
in negotiation. If the court or agency mediation is set early, lawyers will
learn to negotiate earnestly earlier in their other cases. Second, regulation
of mediation may make it so rigid and expensive that it is no better than the
processes it was designed to replace. Statutes that create qualifications and
standards for mediators should be imposed only if clearly shown to be
worth their cost in terms of their benefits for the quality and fairness of the
process or public confidence in the courts. Other approaches in law, such
as duties to raise mediation with clients, codification of laws enforcing
mediation clauses or mediated agreements or statutes that merely authorize
use of mediation seem unlikely to be costly in terms of mediation use but
there also is little evidence that they will contribute substantially to
expanded use.
Advice about drafting the statute to encourage mediation and settlement
approaches should be tempered. The drafters should weigh the other goals
for mediation laws that are discussed elsewhere and determine whether to
opt for these values over the goal of expanding use.
Finally, mediation should be encouraged as a means to another end-
more effective negotiation. Drafters should keep in mind the promise that
mediation use might eventually improve negotiations without mediators,
particularly in expediting resolution and including the parties in the
resolution of their own disputes. Mediation should be scheduled as early as
practical, and the statute should encourage participation by both lawyers
and parties. Carefully drafted laws can lead to improvement in the culture
of disputing, not merely to the increased use of mediation.
[Vol. 13:3 1998]
